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Delivering universal health coverage for an aging population: an 
analysis of the Chinese rural health insurance program 
                             Abstract 
   There is now high level international commitment to the goal of universal health coverage. But 
how can countries make this a reality in the face of a limited budget and an aging population? 
Since 2008, China has been rolling out an ambitious reform program, which aims to achieve 
affordable health insurance coverage for all Chinese citizens. Under this reform program, Chinese 
living in rural areas are eligible to enroll in a subsidized scheme called the New Cooperative 
Medical System (NCMS). Using a three stage game model involving a government, a private fund 
manager and population, we explore the impact of population aging on NCMS. Our model 
highlights the role of government regulation and subsidy in ensuring operation efficiency of the 
system. We show that at optimality the government sets the operating framework for the fund 
manager to constrain the potential for monopoly profits. The Government subsidizes the scheme 
to prevent an adverse selection death spiral. However, the effectiveness of the subsidy in achieving 
this goal is moderated by the age structure of the population. Our model gives insights into the 
strengths of the NCMS framework and also can be used to support decisions about resource 
allocation and understand how scheme dynamics may unfold as the Chinese population ages 
further. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Throughout history, people have lived in fear of the onset of disabling illness-not only 
because of the pain and suffering of the illness itself, but because the financial consequences of 
illness can be devastating. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the advance of medical 
science has made the treatment and cure of many diseases possible, opening up the prospect of a 
future where everyone lives in good health to the natural limit of their lives. 
 
    This inspiring vision has not yet been realized. Medical technology is costly and often 
beyond the means of those who need it most. Perhaps the most heartening development of the 
early years of the twenty-first century has been the number of countries who have implemented, or 
set out on the path towards, Universal Health Coverage (UHC) - the principle that “all people can 
use the promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative and palliative health services they need, of 
sufficient quality to be effective, while also ensuring that the use of these services does not expose 
the user to financial hardship” (WHO, 2016). Many nations, such as Taiwan (Lu and Hisao 2003), 
India (Reddy et al. 2011) and Dutch (Rosenau and Lako 2008), are implementing different 
medical schemes to achieve universal health care. 
 
The path to UHC is beset with challenges. In this paper we explore how population aging 
may threaten a country on its journey to UHC. Our focus will be on China - a country which has 
made a strong commitment to achieve UHC for its citizens, and which faces imminent and severe 
aging, as a legacy of the now-discontinued one-child policy. According to United Nation 
population projections, in 2030 for every Chinese senior aged 65 or over, there will 
be only five under 65s-as opposed to almost ten in 2015 (United Nations, 2015). Within China, we 
focus on the insurance system for the vulnerable rural population. As part of its commitment to 
social solidarity, the Chinese government provides financial support for this part of the population 
through its so-called New Cooperative Medical System (Wagstaff et al., 2009a; Yip et al., 2012). 
 
As the purpose of this research is to explore the challenges faced by the NCMS in the next 
couple of decades, we take a mathematical modeling approach in this paper. Inevitably this 
involves assuming away certain complexities of the system in order to focus on strategic issues. 
Our model of the interactions between the different parties in the system is novel- as the 
organization of the Chinese system is distinctive, and has hitherto attracted little attention from 
theorists. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the New Cooperative 
Medical System and places it an international context. Section 3 describes the assumptions, 
notation, and model. Section 4 discusses the solution procedure and the sensitivity of our results. 
Section 5 illustrates the core concepts of Section 4 with an empirical example. Section 6 discusses 
a generalization of the model wherein we explore a richer model of financing in which individuals 
contribute to the government pool through a universal tax. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2 Background of the New Cooperative Medical System 
 
To finance the medical needs of its citizens for severe diseases or injuries, the Chinese central 
government proposed a primary medical security system (i.e., NCMS) in 2003. NCMS is a 
multi-channel fund-raising system comprising the government, collectives, and individuals. The 
goal is to protect the citizens from poverty due to the high medical costs. NCMS involves four 
parties, namely, the government, NCMS fund managers, designated hospitals, and villagers. Every 
September, the central government and the local government release a budget for NCMS and the 
local government issues a premium subsidy contract for the coming year. For instance, the NCMS 
budget for 2014 was 236.26 billion yuan, and the unit collected level was 410 yuan. The central 
government and the local government subsidized 320 yuan for each enrolled villager. Of course, 
the local government contains different level governments such as provincial governments, 
municipal governments and county-level governments. In this paper, to make the model 
analytically tractable, we combine each level government into a government. 
 
After the collection of the premium and the subsidy, all of the collective funds are placed in a 
fund account named as the NCMS fund. The fund is used in reimbursing the medical fee of those 
enrolled villagers who access medical service from the designated hospitals. Hence, finding a 
professional institution, also known as the NCMS fund manager to manage the fund, is necessary. 
The local government is responsible for selecting the fund manager. Most fund is operated by 
financial departments at the county level. Moreover, some insurance companies, such as China 
Life Insurance Company, China Pacific Insurance Company, and PICC Health Insurance 
Company Limited, are permitted to act as the NCMS fund managers. The fund managers 
maximize their profits by setting the reimbursement rate for the enrolled villagers. For instance, in 
2014, the fund managers of Gansu and Sichuan provinces set the reimbursement rates at 60% and 
70%, respectively. The designated hospitals are certified by the local health departments. Until 
2004, nearly 310 villages had implemented the NCMS in China, and approximately 72.6% of the 
villagers had enrolled in the NCMS. The enrollment rate continued increasing and reached 
approximately 98.9% (almost 736 million villagers) by 2014. 
 
In keeping with what is internationally recognized as a distinctive Chinese policy style 
(Heilmann 2009; Heilmann and Perry 2011), the roll-out of NCMS has been accompanied by the 
launch of local pilots and a concerted attempt by the central government to identify and diffuse 
good practice lessons. In keeping with this philosophy, several studies of local implementation 
have appeared in international journals (for reviews, see Eggleston et al., 2008 and Wagstaff et al, 
2009b; for examples, see the studies in the Special Issue of Health Economics introduced by Yip 
et al., 2009). However, the existing research on NCMS were empirical and focused on the 
question of what worked and why it worked in a particular locality, e.g., Liu et al.(2011), Hu et 
al.(2012), Audibert et al.(2013).  As our intention in this paper is to explore broader questions, 
related to the behavior of the system as the population ages, we take a modeling approach, which 
is more theoretic in nature. There have been, to our knowledge, no modeling studies of NCMS (as 
well as the similar insurance schemes for the Chinese urban populations). 
 
There is of course a long tradition of the modeling of health insurance systems. However, the 
preoccupations of this literature are different from the focus of our paper. In particular, in much of 
the international literature, the interest was in the competition between multiple insurance funds. 
In this paper we are interested in a setting where insurance funds do not compete directly for 
customers and the problem of (for example) funds seeking to divert high risk customers to other 
schemes do not arise. In the model we develop, the government offsets the tendency of firms to 
exploit their local monopoly position by setting contract terms in order to achieve efficiency. 
 
   This paper aims to answer the following questions: How does the government design the 
NCMS contract to maximize the number of enrollees? Does the age structure of the villagers 
matter when the government designs the contract? How does the fund manager respond to the 
contract issued by the government? To this end, we develop a three-stage game model involving 
three players, namely, a government, a fund manager, and villagers. We solve the game and derive 
the optimal contract of the government to demonstrate that (1) the optimal contract depends on the 
population and the age structure of the villagers, (2) the age structure of the villagers largely 
affects the implementation performance of the NCMS (the number of enrollees is larger with 
fewer or more aging citizens, and the enrollment rate reaches the least when the degree of aging 
among the citizens is moderate), and (3) the fund manager is forced/induced to choose a 
reimbursement rate such that the fund manager collects zero profit. 
 3 The Model 
 
We model the players’ interaction in NCMS of China as a three-stage game. The three players 
are the government, the fund manager and the villagers. The Chinese government’s stated 
objective is to achieve universal coverage and so for the purposes of the model we assume that the 
government aims to maximize the number of enrollees. 
 
In the first stage, the government off ers a subsidy contract ( , , )T S  , in which each villager 
who enrolls in the NCMS should pay a portion of the premium, ( 0)T  ,to the fund manager, and the 
government off ers subsidy ( 0)S  , which is turned over to the fund manager, for each enrollee as 
the remaining amount of the premium. Meanwhile, when the fund manager decides the 
reimbursement rate , it has to meet a requirement on the reimbursement rate,   where 
0 1  . For instance, the central government announced in 2014 that the NCMS premium is 410 
yuan, of which the government subsidizes 320 yuan for each enrollee and the enrollee pays for the 
remaining 90 yuan; meanwhile, the required reimbursement rate in Sichuan Province is 70% . Thus, 
the contract is T = 90 yuan, S = 320 yuan, and 70%  . For convenience, we refer to T and S as 
the premium and subsidy, respectively, throughout the paper. Furthermore, the central government 
is faced with a finance budget B ; that is, the total amount of subsidy should be smaller than B. For 
instance, the NCMS budget in 2014 was 236.26 billion yuan. The goal of the government is to 
maximize the number of enrollees. 
 
In the second stage of the game, we assume that the NCMS fund is charged by only one fund 
manager. The NCMS fund comprises the premium and subsidy of each enrollee. After a enrollee 
goes to the designated hospital for medical service, the fund manager should reimburse a portion
 of medical fee for her. The reimbursement rate should be no less than the rate required by the 
government ,i.e.,  ,. For instance, in 2016, the fund managers of Shanxi Province and Inner 
Mongolia set 75%  ; both rates are no lower than the governmental requirement 75%  . The 
objective of the fund manager is to set the reimburse rate θ to maximize the profit. 
 
In the final stage of the game, we assume that the total population of the rural residents is
and each resident has a probability p of seeking medical service from hospitals, i.e., visiting rate, 
where p draws from kF distribution with probability density function 1( ) (1 )kf p k p   where 0k   
(see Debo, et al. 2005). Figure 1 plots the density function ( )f p for three diff erent values of k . As
k increases, the mass of villagers shifts from the high probability region to the low probability 
region. Generally speaking, older villagers have a high probability of seeking medical service. In 
this sense, the smaller the value of k is, the more elderly the population is. Hence, k represents the 
degree of aging of the village population. 
 Figure 1: Examples of the kF distribution: 0.1,  1,  10k   
We assume that the medical expenses of the villagers, denoted byC , are homogeneous. The 
villagers decide whether to enroll in NCMS based on the objective of minimizing their expected 
expenses. Denote by 1 2( )( ( ))E p E p  the expected expense of the villager with visiting rate p , when 
he/she enrolls (does not enroll) in NCMS. We assume that the villagers are risk neutral and 
rational. Hence, they are willing to enroll in NCMS if and only if 1 2( ) ( )E p E p . Intuitively, 
villagers will be more willing to enroll NCMS if they are risk averse. Thus, the assumption of risk 
neutrality allows us to identify other factors that aff ect villagers’ behavior. Finally, the contract 
off ered by the government and the distribution of visiting rate p are common knowledge for the 
government, the fund manager, and all of the villagers, but a villager’s visiting rate is her private 
information unobservable by other villagers, the fund manager, and the government. 
 
4  Model Analysis 
 
The government acts as a Stackelberg leader, and the fund manager and villagers act as the 
followers. To solve this problem, we use backward induction. 
 
4.1 Villager behavior 
In this section, we determine the choice of the villagers when they know the decisions 
of the government and the fund manager, i.e., the premiumT , the subsidy S and the 
reimbursement rate . The net payoff of joining and not joining NCMS for a villager with 
visiting rate p is respectively given by 
1( ) (1 )E p pC T   , 
2( )E p Cp  
 denotes the expected number of enrollees and denotes the expected number of enrollees 
who require medical service and receive reimbursement. The following theorem reports the 
equilibrium behavior of the villagers. 
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 Theorem 1. The equilibrium behavior of the villagers is given in the following cases: 
 
1. When / 1T C   , a villager will enroll only when the visiting rate is high, i.e., 
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2. When 0 /T C  , none of the villagers is willing to enroll. Correspondingly, 0,   and
0  . 
Proof: 1. When /T C  , if 
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 , then 1 2( ) ( )E p E p , and these villagers will enroll in 
NCMS. Thus,  
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 2. When /T C  , or 1
T
C
 , we obtain that for any p , 
1 2( ) ( )E p Cp Tp T Cp E p     , 
Such that on one wants to participate in NCMS. Thus, 0,  0.    
According to Theorem 1, the enrolling decision of the villagers depends on the probability of 
seeking medical service. If the probability is high, the expected medical expense of the villagers is 
substantially high, thereby it is better off enrolling in NCMS which provides reimbursements. By 
contrast, if the villagers have a low probability of seeking medical service, the expected medical 
expense may be smaller than the premium, thus making enrolling in NCMS undesirable. This 
situation explains why elderly villagers have a stronger preference of enrolling in NCMS more 
than young villagers. 
 
4.2 Decision of the fund manager 
The goal of the fund manager is to maximize its expected profit by setting the reimbursement 
rate with the knowledge on the contract specified by the government. We denote ( )FM  as the 
expected profit of the fund manager, and the fund manager’s problem can be formulated as 
max ( ) ( )
        . . 1
FM T S C
s t

   
 
  
 
 
The following theorem presents the optimal decision of the fund manager. 
 
Theorem 2. The optimal reimbursement rate of the fund manager is given in the following 
cases: 
 
1. When 0 max{ ( 1) ,0},T C k S    the optimal strategy of the fund manager is to quit. In this 
case, the NCMS is not feasible. See region (I) in Figure 2. 
*
2. When 1max{ ( 1) ,0} ( )C k S T T S     , the optimal strategy of the fund manager is to set the 
reimbursement rate as low as possible; that is, *  . See region (II) in Figure 2. 
3. When 1 2( ) ( )T S T T S  , the optimal reimbursement rate is 
               
2 2
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2
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See region (III) in Figure 2. 
4. When 2( )T S T C  , the optimal strategy of the fund manager is to set a maximum 
reimbursement rate, that is, * 1.   See region (IV ) in Figure 2. 
In particular, 
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Proof. See the supporting information in Appendix A. 
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for villagers;       :the reimbursement  rate required by the government;                      is given in 
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Figure 2: Optimal strategy of the fund manager 
Apparently, when both the premium and subsidy are small, the amount of the NCMS funding 
is small as well. In this case, the fund manager cannot afford to reimburse the medical service 
received by the enrolled residents. Hence, the fund manager quits the NCMS (because of the 
negative expected profit). Consider the scenario in which the fund manager does not quits the 
NCMS fund, i.e., max{ ( 1) ,0}T C k S   . When the premium is small (i.e., 1( )T T S , the fund 
manager will limit the reimbursement rate at to maximize its profit. When the premium is 
between 1( )T S and 2 ( )T S , the fund manager sets a reimbursement rate larger than the requirement of 
the government; that is,
2 2
* (1 ) (1 ) 4 ( 1)
2
k T k T kT k S
C
 
    
  .When the premium is larger (i.e., 
2 ( )T T S ), the fund manager reimburses the entire medical fee of the enrolled residents; that is, 
* 1  . In fact, we can show that for any given subsidy S , the reimbursement rate increases in the 
premiumT . 
 
 
4.3 Government decision 
In this section, we study the government’s decision on contract design ( , , )T S  . Ensuring a 
required reimbursement rate (i.e., 0  ), the government aims to maximize the number of 
enrollees, within a finance budget B . According to Theorem 1, the government’s problem can be 
formulated as 
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Theorem 3.  The government’s optimal contract * * *( , , )T S  is given in the following cases. 
1. When 0
1
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In this case, the associated number of enrollees is 
1
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In this case, all of the villagers enroll in NCMS, i.e., *   . 
Proof. See the supporting information in Appendix B. 
Remark 1.  In Case 2 of Theorem 3, the finance budget is substantial (i.e., 0
1
C
B
k



) ,thus the 
government can guarantee that all of the villagers are involved in NCMS. Hence, the model (B) 
has infinite optimal solutions. In this case, we assume that the government shall choose the 
solution maximizing the reimbursement rate. 
Theorem 3 shows that whether NCMS is a multi-channel fund-raising system or a fully 
funded government system depends on finance budget B. When the budget is low( 0
1
C
B
k



), the 
optimal policy of the government is to run NCMS as a multi-channel fund-raising system. In this 
case, the government pays the subsidy, 
1
01 1( ) ( )
1
k
k k
CB
k

 
 
, for each enrolled resident, and each enrolled 
resident pays the premium 
1
01 1
0 ( 1)( ) ( )
1
k
k k
CB
C k
k

   
 
. In this case, only a portion of the residents will 
enroll in NCMS, which is the case in China. In 2011, the Chinese central government issued the 
NCMS contract as 30T  yuan, 200S  yuan, and 0.45  . According to China health statistics 
yearbook 2012, 832 million (around 97%) of the residents were enrolled in NCMS by the end of 
June 2011. When the budget is sufficiently large ( 0
1
C
B
k



), NCMS becomes a fully funded 
government system and achieves universal health coverage. In this case, the government sets a 
required reimbursement rate as large as possible; that is,
( 1)
min{ ,1}
k B
C




. Meanwhile, the 
government pays for the entire insurance premiums
B

for the residents. In other words, the 
residents enroll in NCMS for free. 
The threshold of the budget depends not only on the population of villagers, but also on the 
age structure of the village population. A population that is larger or has more aging villagers 
requires a substantial budget. In the subsequent discussion, we focus on the behavior of the fund 
manager under the optimal contract adopted by the government. It is easy to check that under the 
optimal contract, the condition specified in Case 2. in Theorem 2 holds (i.e., 
* * * *
1max{ ( 1) ,0} ( )C k S T T S     ), and thus, the following result is immediate. 
Corollary 1. Under the optimal contract, the resulting fund manager’s decision on the 
reimbursement rate is *  . In this case, the profit of the fund manager is zero. 
Taking the advantage of the first mover, the government would provide a contract that 
compels the fund manager to earn zero profit, though the fund manager chooses the most possibly 
low reimbursement rate . Thus, effectively the government is setting contract terms for the fund 
manager which offset the fund manager’s ability to exploit its monopoly position to earn excess 
profits, thus ensuring that the entire budget is channeled to the villagers. 
Proposition 1. 
1. * * * * * */ 0, / 0, / 0, ( , , ) / 0;T B S B B T S B               
2. 
* * * * * *
0 0 0 0/ 0, / 0, / 0, ( , , ) / 0T S T S                ; 
3. When 0
1
C
B
k



,
** 2 * 2 */ 0, / 0, / 0, / 0,T k k S k S k           £
* *2 * * 2 * *( , , ) / 0, ( , , ) / 0.T S k T S k       ¤  
4. When 0, 0.B    
Proof. See the supporting information in Appendix B3. 
 
We draw attention first to part 4. of Proposition 1, which is important in understanding the 
scheme dynamics. Part 4. highlights that in the absence of government subsidy, the scheme is not 
viable: it exhibits an “adverse selection death spiral” (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998), whereby at 
equilibrium none enrolls in the scheme. The optimality of this solution reflects a dynamic whereby 
lower risk individuals opt out of the insurance program because they do not wish to cover the 
costs of their higher risk colleagues, resulting in a constantly shrinking enrollee base. In reality, 
health insurance is viable because of risk aversion, but in our model there is no risk aversion, and 
the only incentive for individuals to enroll is the subsidy. 
 
The other parts of the proposition give other insights. Part 1. shows that, unsurprisingly, as 
the budget increases, the government can issue a more flexible contract, such as reducing the 
premium and increasing the subsidy. Part 2. shows that when the external required reimbursement 
rate increases, the premium, the subsidy, and the required reimbursement rate increases, but the 
number of enrollees decreases. Part 3. provides the answer to our main motivating questions about 
the impact of population aging. The population aging matters (i.e., the optimal contract and the 
number of enrollees vary with respect to k ) only when the budget is insufficient to ensure full 
coverage. In this case, as the population ages, the premium becomes larger. Meanwhile, it is 
interesting to observe that the relationship between population aging and subsidy and the number 
of enrollees are not monotone. Specifically, S is concave while is convex in k . These results will 
be explored further in next section. 
 
5  Empirical Example 
 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the degree of population aging k plays an important 
role in the optimal contract and the number of enrollees. Thus, it is of great interest to estimate the 
value of k . In this section, we use the real data to do this. Similar to Kasteridis et al, (2014), we 
use the probability of getting a chronic disease to represent the probability of seeking medical 
service. (In fact, it is very challenging to get the probability of seeking medical service for rural 
resident.) We first collect the population data in diff erent age ranges from China Population and 
Employment Statistics Yearbook 2014, and then collect the chronic diseases rate of rural residents 
in diff erent age ranges from China’s health and family planning statistics yearbook 2015, which 
are listed in following table. 
                        Table 1: Population profile 
Age  
Chronic diseases(%)  
ix  
Population 
in  
Percentage to Total Population(%)  ip  
years15-24 1.22 71107 17.1111 
years 25-34 3.82 68274 16.4295 
years 35-44 11.84 76718 18.4614 
years 45-54 23.00 77699 18.6974 
years 55-64 36.78 64670 15.5622 
over 65 years 48.17 57091 13.7383 
 
Based on ix and ip in the above table, we use 
2  test to check how well the kF distribution 
fits the sampling distribution, where the parameter k of kF  distribution is estimated by the 
maximum likelihood function. As convention (e.g., Turnbull 1976, Marwa et al. 2013), we divide 
the range of variation 0 6( , )t t  into 6 intervals. Let 1 2 3 4 5, , , ,t t t t t be the dividing points, such that
0 1 2 3 4 5 60 1t t t t t t t         and , 1( )( 1,2,3,4,5,6)i i it x x i  where 7 1x  . The interval
1( , )i it t will be referred to as the i th interval or the i th group, and the points , ( 0,1,...,6)it i  will be 
called group limits, the number of observation falling into one of the i adjacent groups, say i , will 
be denoted by in . Then, the optimal it and k are derived from the following optimization problem. 
        
6
11,
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6
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. .             0
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                     (5.1) 
 Solving the above optimization problem yields solution as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 64.4,  0, 0.0356,  0.0863,  0.1519,  0.2438,  0.3679,  1 k t t t t t t t          ( 5 . 2 ) 
Then, we can get the value of ( )iF t  associated with the solution. On this basis, we use
2 test to 
check how well the 2 distribution with 4.4k   fits the sampling distribution. In this case, the 
null hypothesis is 4.4k   and the 2 statistic is 
2
6 1
1
( ( ) ( ))i i i
i
i
p F t F t
p


 
  
By computing, p−value for 2 test is 1 (which is greater than 0.1), so we do not reject the null 
hypothesis, thereby indicating that the kF distribution with 4.4k  fits the real data very well. 
 
The value of k should be diff erent across regions. However, because the specific data of 
villages or provinces is unavailable or inaccessible, we do not have a complete data set to estimate 
the value of k for each region. Instead, we use the value estimated by the data aggregated into the 
nation level to represent the value of k for diff erent regions. Next, we use this estimated k to 
demonstrate whether the contract currently implemented by the government is optimal. 
  
In our model, the medical expense of each person within a populationC is homogeneous. The 
real data about per capita health expenditure for diff erent regions in China can be found in China 
statistical yearbooks, and we take each region’s per capita health expenditure in 2014 as the value 
ofC for the corresponding region. Also, the rural population of diff erent regions can be found in 
some statistical yearbooks. For instance, one can find in Henan Statistical Yearbook 2014 that the 
rural population of Henan in 2013 was 82.56557 million. Moreover, each year’s budget granted by 
the governments at all levels equals the diff erence between the amount of capital raised this year 
and the amount of personal financing. Table 2 summarizes these real data. 
 
Table 2: Population, budget and per capita health expenditure 
Region Total population 
( , million person) 
Budget this year 
( B , million yuan) 
Per capita health expenditure 
(C, yuan) 
Henan 82.56557 23782.30 1791.68 
Sichuan 62.92285 17939.70 2066.41 
Hainan 4.94421 1413.75 2067.69 
Hunan 47.78415 13746.19 1953.09 
Hubei 39.56919 11976.84 2123.10 
Jiangxi 34.07022 9481.22 1632.17 
Hebei 56.59960 14731.16 2026.92 
Anhui 51.18700 15858.26 2015.71 
Shanxi 22.08497 6285.78 2018.84 
Chonging 22.67730 8036.36 2482.61 
 
From this table, we can see that per capita health expenditure is diff erent across regions and 
the range is wide; for instance, the health expenditure per person was 2482.61 yuan in Chongqing , 
whereas is only 1632.17 yuan in Jiangxi. For this reason, the optimal contract for diff erent regions 
should be diff erent. The calculation result is presented in Table 3, of which we denote 
* * *, ,T S  ,and * * *( , , )UR T S   as the premium, subsidy, required reimbursement rate and utilization 
of fund in our model. To distinguish the theoretical result and the real data, we use the superscript
" "a to refer to the real data; that is, the actual premium, subsidy, required reimbursement rate and 
utilization fund are denoted by , ,a a aT S   and ( , , )a a aUR T S  respectively. 
 
Table 3: Comparison between the actual data and the theoretical result 
 
Region 
 
Premium 
(yuan) 
Subsidy 
(yuan) 
Required 
Reimbursement 
Rate(%) 
Utilization Rate of Funds(%) 
 From Table 3, we find that in general, the government should lower the premium, improve 
the subsidy, and improve the reimbursement rate. Take Henan as an example, according to our 
model, the government should set premium at 0 (rather than 60) and subsidy at 288 (rather than 
280); to improve the utilization of funds, the government should improve the reimbursement rate 
to 87% at which the fund will be used out. In addition, the actual premium and subsidy are almost 
the same across regions. Our model result, however, demonstrates that the government should 
off er diff erent premium and subsidy for diff erent regions. This is because the economic level, the 
health expenditure and the population are diff erent across regions. We also observe that the actual 
subsidy is close to the theoretical one for each region, whereas the premium is not. Thus, reducing 
the premium can be the first step for the government to improve the efficiency of funds. 
 
The government realized that the utilization extent of funds is low in many regions, and to 
address this, some regions have implemented so-called the secondary compensation policy for 
patients. To some extent, this post-adjustment measure improves the utilization of fund and benefit 
patients. However, it brings many issues meanwhile. The implement not only requires a vast of 
human and material resources, but also requires extra eff orts from patients and medical institution,
. .e g , the handling cost and travel cost. Moreover, the secondary reimbursement policy will be 
released at the end of a year, and thus, it cannot meet desperate need of low wealth patients. As 
Table 3 shows, the fund’s utilization in Chongqing was 73.2% even after the secondary 
compensation policy was implemented. This highlights the important of designing the scheme 
optimally region by region. 
 
6 Extensions 
 
a
T  
*
T  aS  
*S  a  
*
  
a a a
( , , )UR T S   
* * *
( , , )UR T S   
Henan  60 0 280 288 80 87 90.7 100 
Sichuan 60 1.4 280 286.7 75 75 98.2 100 
Hainan 60 1.2 280 286.9 75 75 97.3 100 
Hunan 60 1.2 280 287.7 75 79.54 96.4 100 
Hubei 60 0 280 302.7 75 76.99 94.1 100 
Jiangxi 60 0 280 278.3 75 92.07 93.5 100 
Hebei 60 2.5 280 262.3 70 70 98 100 
Anhui 60 0 280 310.0 80 82.64 93.4 100 
Shanxi 60 0 280 284.6 75 76.09 96.3 100 
Chongqing 60 0 280 4 75 77.08 73.2 100 
Consistent with the current goal of NCMS in China, the government’s objective in the basic 
model is assumed to maximize the number of enrollees. Maximizing the populace welfare, in fact, 
can be another important key performance indicator for the government. In this extended model, 
we assume that the government aims to maximize the populace welfare, which consists of rewards 
and costs of receiving medical service. We assume that the reward is homogeneously given, and 
hence, maximizing the populace welfare is equivalent to minimizing the cost. Denote by the total 
payment of villagers TC, which contains the payment of villagers who enroll in NCMS 
(1 ) ((1 ) )k
T
pC T
C
     and the payment of villagers who do not enroll in NCMS
(1 (1 )) )k
T
pC
C
   . Moreover, we assume that the fund for NCMS is collected from the medical 
service providers. Specifically, the government taxes the providers with a tax rate
0(0 1)r r r    . Note that the tax policy does not aff ect the decision of the villagers and the 
fund manager directly. That is, in the presence of tax policy, when the contract is given, the 
villagers and the fund manager still act according to Theorems 1 and 2. Thus the amount of fund 
satisfies 
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and the government’s optimization problem can be formulated as 
1
0, , ,
1
0
0
min ((1 ) ) ( ) ( )
. .         (1 )
             (1 ) ( ) ( )
             0
             0
             1
             0
T
C
T
r T S
C
k
T
C
T
C
TC Cp T dF p CpdF p
T
s t S
C
r CpdF p CpdF p
T C
S
r








 
    
   
 
     
  
 

 
 
 
 
0r
               (E) 
       
Solving the government’s problem yields the optimal contract given as follows. 
 
Theorem 4.  When the objective of the government is to maximize the populace welfare, the 
optimal contract is as follows. 
 (1.) If 0 01r k , then
* * * *
0 1 0 1 01 , , ( 1) ,kr S S T C kr k S r r       . 
(2.) If 0 01r k , then 
* * * *
0 1 0 1 0, , ( 1) ,S S T C k S r r        . 
Theorem 4 demonstrates that the optimal tax rate equals the most possibly large value 0r
such that the government can increase the amount of funding as much as possible. Then, the 
government would use out the funding to subsidize the villagers such that their welfare would be 
increased. Interestingly, Theorem 4 demonstrates that when the tax rate is low, a high 
reimbursement rate is adopted. It is somehow counterintuitive, but reasonable because a high 
premium is charged. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have presented a novel model of China’s New Cooperative Medical System 
(NCMS). We believe that our model is insightful and captures important features of the dynamics 
as the dynamics of the NCMS. Our model highlights the important role of the government in 
preventing the local insurance fund from exploiting its local monopoly through setting contract 
terms, and preventing an adverse selection death spiral through the provision of subsidy to 
enrollees. Our model highlights important implications for China’s pathway to universal coverage 
as the population ages. Obviously, and not surprisingly, as the population grows older, the need for 
healthcare will increase, and so will associated expenditures. Unless central government budgets 
increase, this expenditure will fall back on the enrollees. Using actual data to calibrate the model, 
we find that the premium is higher while the reimbursement rate is lower in the contract currently 
implemented by the government than these in the theoretically optimal one. Meanwhile, the 
subsidy is in general lower than the optimum. Moreover, our model result demonstrates that the 
government should off er diff erent premium and subsidy for diff erent regions, rather than 
providing the uniform scheme of premium and subsidy. One of the perhaps surprising features of 
the model is that the relationship between population aging, i.e., older populations do not 
necessarily have lower enrollment. This highlights an important insight, namely that as the 
population ages, the costs of health insurance increase, but so do the benefits. However the age 
structure of the population interacts with ability of the subsidy to mitigate an adverse selection 
death spiral, giving rise to the nonmonotonic relationship which we see in Proposition 1. The 
scenario in which the government aims to maximize the populace welfare and the government 
finances the fund via taxation is discussed. The result shows that the government would charge a 
tax rate as high as possible to subsidize the enrollees, but a high tax rate does not lead to a high 
reimbursement rate. 
Our study can be extended in several directions. First, considering the case that the villagers don’t 
see a doctor when Second, for ease of exploration, we set the probability of seeking medical 
service obeying a distribution according to relationship between the aging of degree and the 
probability of requiring medical service, in further, we can extend this specific distribution 
function to a general distribution function. Lastly, although the details of the model are specific to 
China, the policy issue is of much more general concern. An interesting question for further 
research would be to compare the impact of population aging on the healthcare systems or other 
countries which are striving for universal coverage, in order to better understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of diff erent national models. We also hope that this paper stimulates further theoretic 
studies of the Chinese healthcare system. Considerable care and attention has gone into the design 
of the Chinese system and it merits greater international study and attention than it has received 
hitherto. 
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Appendix B1:  the proof of Theorem 2 
According to Theorem 1, 0  when /T C  . Hence, we only need to prove the case of
/T C  . In this case, the profit function of the fund manager is 
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Deriving the following equations is easy: 
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According to the FOC, the maximizer of ( )FM  (denoted by r ) is given by 
2 2(1 ) (1 ) 4 ( ( 1) )
.
2
r
k T k T kT T k S
C

     
  
r is increasing in T , and verifying that 1( )T S  is the unique root of r  with respect to T and 
2 ( )T S is the unique root of 1r   with respect toT is easy. Thus 
22 2 2 2 2
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Then, the decision model of the fund manager can be given by 
max ( ) (1 ) ( ),       
      
     
1
. .    1
 
,
/ .    
kT C TFM S
C k
s t
T C








   

 

     (A.1) 
Comparing withT C , Model (A.1) can be solved using the following two models: 
max ( ) (1 ) ( ),                
1
. .     1,
            
kT C TFM S
C k
s t
T C








   

 

    (A.2) 
and 
max ( ) (1 ) ( ),              
1
. .     / 1,
                .
kT C TFM S
C k
s t T C
T C







   

 

      (A.3) 
We initially solve Model (A.2), and the solution can be classified into three subcases: 
When 10 ( )T T S  , by the definition of r and r is increasing inT , r  . By the concavity of 
( )FM  , ( ) ( )FM FM   for any [ ,1]  . For max{ ( 1) ,0}T C k S   , 
max{ ( 1) ,0}
( ) (1 ) ( )
1
( 1)
      (1 ) ( )
1
      0.
k
k
T C C k S
FM S
C k
T C C k S
S
C k
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
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
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Recall that 1( 1) ( ) ,C k S T S C      such that when 1max{ ( 1) ,0} ( ) ,C k S T S C      then 
*  , For 0 ( 1)T C k S     and0
1
C
S
k

 

, as ( ) 0FM   , the fund manager will quit 
the market. The fund manager will quit the market when max{ ( 1) ,0}0 C kT S    . 
1. When 1 2( ) min{ ( ), },T S T T S C   according to the definitions of 1( )T S  and 2 ( )T S , 
1,r    such that  
( 1)
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 0.
1
k
r
T C C k S
FM FM S
C k





  
     

 
Thus, 
*
r  .  
2. When 2min{ ( ), } ,T S C T C   1r  and ( )FM  is increasing in [ ,  1] . 2T (S)>C-(k+1)S , 
thus, for 2min{ ( ), }T S C T C   , 
( 1)
(1) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 0.
1 1
k kT C T C C C k SFM S S
C k C k
   
        
 
       (7.1) 
We obtain * 1  . 
Next, we solve Model (A.3). Note that 
2 2(1 ) (1 ) 4 ( 1) ) (1 ) (1 )
2 2
r
k T k T kT k S k T k T T
C C C
 
       
     
by the definition of 1T (S) , 1T (S)<T . Hence, Model (A.3) can be solved by the following two 
subcases: 
1. When 1r   , that is, 1 2( ) ( )T S T T S  . ( ) ( ) 0r
T
FM FM
C
    and 2T C ; thus, if 
2( ) ,T S C  then 1 2( ) ( )T S T T S   conflicts with the constraint that T C , implying no feasible 
solutions; if 2( )T S C , then for 2( ),C T T S  
* .r   In summary, if 
2max{ ( ),  }C T T S C   , then
* .r   
2.  When 1r  , that is, 2( )T T S . (1) 0FM  ( see (7.1)) and the constraint T C ; thus, if 
2max{ ( ),  }T CS T C   , then 
* 1  . 
Combining the results of Models (A.2) and (A.3), we can obtain the result in Theorem 2. 
 
Appendix B2: the proof of Theorem 3 
 
According to Theorem 2, the decision Model (B) can be divided into the following three models: 
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                     Figure 3: The curves of ( ),  M(S), N(S)L S  
For convenience, we denote * * *( , , )i i iT S  as the optimal solution of Model ( . )B i  and define
1
( ) ( )k
B
L S C C
S
  

. We solve Models (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3) and begin with Model (B.1), which 
can be divided into the following two models: 
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and 
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                      (B12) 
We also denote * * *
1 1 1( , , )i i iT S  as the optimal solution of Model ( . )B i . To solve Model (B.11), we 
use the following two-step procedure: 
1) Given , we derive the optimum * *
1 1( ( ), ( ))S T  of Model (B.11); 
2) Model (B.11) is recast into an optimal model with decision variable θ by substituting ( , )B T  
with * *
1 1( ( ), ( ))S T   into Model (B.11) . 
We begin with Step 1 and solve the following model: 
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and is increasing with S ; thus, we can solve Model (B.111) by 
considering two diff erent cases: 
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. Let * * *
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1
1 1( ) ( )
1
k
k k
B c
S
k

 
 
 (see Figure 3). 
Hence,
1
* 1 1
1 ( ) ( ) ( )
1
k
k k
B c
S
k

  
 
and
1
* * 1 1
1 1( ) ( ( )) ( 1)( ) ( )
1
k
k k
B c
T L S C k
k

       
 
. Regarding 
Step 2, incorporating
*
1 ( )T  and
*
1 ( )S  into Model (B.11), the model becomes 
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( )  is decreasing in  and thus the solution of Model (B.11a) (denoted by *
1  )is
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Now, we focus on Model (B.12). Similar to the proof of Model (B.11), we can also solve 
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1) When 0
1
C
B
k



, the optimal solution is 
1
* * * 0
12 12 12 0 0 0
0
( 1)
( , , ) ( ( ) ), , )
1
k
Ck B
T S C C
C k

   


 
 
, and 
* * *
12 12 12
0
( 1)
( , , )
k B
T S
C
 


 . 
2) When 0
1
C
B
k



 , the optimal solution is 
*
* * *
12 12 12 0
( 1)
( , , ) (0,[ , ],[ , ])
1
C B k B
T S
k C

 


  
 , and
* * *
12 12 12( , , )T S     
3) When
1
C
B
k



, the optimal solution is 
*
* * *
12 12 12 0( , , ) (0,[ , ],[ ,1])
1
C B
T S
k

 
 
, and
* * *
12 12 12( , , )T S     
Comparing the solution of Model (B.11) to the solution of Model (B.12), we obtain the 
solution of Model(B.1) as follows: 
(1) When 0
1
C
B
k



, as  
1 1
* ** * * *1 1 1 1
11 1211 11 12 12
0 0 0
( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , , ),
k k
k k k k
k B k B k B
T S T S
C C C
 
 


    
  
     
it follows that the solution of Model (B.1) is exactly the same as the solution of Model (B.11), that 
is, 
1 1
* * * 0 01 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0( , , ) ( ( 1)( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) , )
1 1
k k
k k k k
C CB B
T S C k
k k
 
       
   
 
then 
1
* * * 1 1
1 1 1
0
( 1)
( , , ) ( )
k
k k
k B
T S
C
 

 

  . 
2) When 0
1 1
C C
B
k k
 
 
 
, as 
* * * * * *
11 11 11 12 12 12( , , ) ( , , )T S T S       
then the solution of Model (B.1) is the same as the solution of Model (B.11) or (B.12), that is, 
*
* * *
1 1 1 0
( 1)
( , , ) (0,[ , ],[ , ])
1
C B k B
T S
k C

  


  
 
then * * *
1 1 1( , , )T S     
For convenience, we define  
1
2
1 1
( 1) [1 ( ) ]
( )
( ) (1 ( ) )
k
k k
B
k k S
SM S
B B
k k
S S
 

 
   
We can easily obtain that ( )M S  is increasing with S . Therefore, Model (B.2) can be divided 
into the following two models: 
, ,
2
1 2
0
2
max ( , , ) (1 ) ,         
1 (1 ) 4 ( 1) )
. .            ( ),
             ( ) ( ),
                 1
                   .
k
T S
T S
S
k k k k
T
s t T M S
T S T T S
B
S

 
 
  
    

 
 


        (B.11) 
 
, ,
2
1 2
0
2
max ( , , ) (1 )
1 (1 ) 4 ( 1) )
. .             0,
              ( ) ( ),
                  1,
                   
           
.
    k
T S
T S
S
k k k k
T
s t T
T S T T S
B
S

 
 
  
    

 
 


              (B.22) 
Denote by 
** *
22 2( , , )ii iT S   the optimal solution of Model ( .2 )B i . 
We initially solve Model ( .21)B , which can be solved in the same manner as Model ( .11)B
(i.e., the two-step procedure) in the sense that ( )L S  is replaced by ( )M S and that ( 1)C k    
is replaced by 1( )T S .  
The optimal solution is given by 
* 2 2 *2 2 2 2 *
21 0 21 0 0 21* * * *
21 21 21 2 0 0
( 1) (1 ) ( 1) ( 1) 2 (1 )(1 )
( , , ) ( , ( ), )
2
k k S C k k k S C k C S k k k
T S S
k
  
 
          
 and 
*
* * * 21
21 21 21
0
( , , ) (1 )k
T
T S
C
 

   . 
The solution of Model ( .22)B  is likewise given by  
2 2 2 2 2 2
0 0 0
* * *
22 22 22 0
( 1) (1 ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) 2 (1 )(1 )
( ,  , ) , , ,
2
B B B
k k C k k k C k C k k k
B
T S
k
  

 
           
   
 
 
 
and 
*
** * 22
2222 22
0
( , , ) (1 ) .k
T
T S
C


    
 
We subsequently compare the solution of Models ( .21)B  and ( .22)B . We define 
1 1f (S)=M(S)-T (S) , then 1f (S)  is increasing with S  as M(S)  is increasing withS and 1( )T S  is 
increasing withS . We can obtain 
* *
1 22 1 1 21( ) ( ) 0 ( )
B
f S f f S  

, thus
* *
21 22S S . Furthermore, as 1( )T S  
is increasing with S , then 
* * * *
21 1 21 1 22 22( ) ( )T T S T S T    and 
* *
* ** * * *22 21
22 2122 22 21 21
0 0
( , , ) (1 ) (1 ) ( , , ).k k
T T
T S T S
C C
 
 
         
Thus, the solution of Model (B.2) is the same as the solution of Model (B.21), that is, 
* 2 2 *2 2 2 2 *
2 0 2 0 0 2* * * *
2 2 2 2 0 0
( 1) (1 ) ( 1) ( 1) 2 (1 )(1 )
( , , ) ( , ( ), )
2
k k S C k k k S C k C S k k k
T S S
k
  
  
          
 and 
*
** * 2
22 2
0
( , , ) (1 ) .k
T
T S
C
 

    
Model (B.3), which can be also solved in a similar manner, and the solution is given by 
 ** * * *33 3 3 3 0( , , ) ( ), , ,T S N S S   and
** *
33 3 *
3
( , , )
B
T S
S
  , where 
*
3S  is the unique root of the equation 
2( ) ( )N S T S with respect to S and
1
( ) ( )k
B
N S C C
S
 

. 
Finally, we compare among the solution of Models (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3). 
1. When 0
1
C
B
k



, from the solutions of Model  (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3), it is clear that  
*
* * * 1
1 1 1 *
0 1
*
* * * 2
2 2 2
0
* * *
3 3 3 *
3
( , , ) (1 ) ,
( , , ) (1 ) ,
( , , ) ,
k
k
T B
T S
C S
T
T S
C
B
T S
S
 
 




   
  

 
and  
* * *
1 2 3 0     . 
We initially compare between 
* * *
2 2 2( , , )T S   and 1 1
* *
1
*( , , )T S  . Let point ( ,  T)S  satisfy 
0 01
( ) | ( ) |T S L S T     . 
Note that 1( ) ( 1)T S C k S    holds for any S and  , ( )L S  is increasing with S and 
* *
1 1( ) ( 1)L S C k S    holds for any  , it follows that 
* * *
1 1 1 1( )( ) ( 1)L S C k S ST    , i.e., 
*
1
*
1 1( ) ( ) 0T LS S  . Moreover, as 1( )T S  is decreasing in S , it follows that 1( ) ( )T S L S  is 
decreasing in S . By the definition of S , it follows that given 0  , we obtain 
* *
1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )T S L S T S L S    holds, thus 
*
1S S and 
* *
1 1( ) ( )T L S L S T   (See Figure 3). 
We then define  
1
2
1
2 1 1
( 1) [1 ( ) ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) (1 ( ) )
k
k
k k
B
k k S
BSf S M S L S C C
SB B
k k
S S
 
 
    

 
 
, 
which is increasing with S . Obviously, 2 ( ) 0
B
f 

. Thus, when 
B
S 

, it follows that 2 ( ) 0f S  , 
that is, ( ) ( )M S L S . Recall that 1( )T S  is decreasing in S and 
* *
1 2 2( ) ( )T S M S  holds for any . 
Hence, 
* * *
1 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( )T S M S L S  , i.e., 
* *
1 2 2( ) ( ) 0T S L S  . 
Since 1( ) ( )T S L S  is decreasing in S .  Given 0  , by the definition of S , we can 
obtain that 
* *
1 2 2 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0T S L S T S L S    , thus, we can obtain
*
2S S and 
* *
2 1 2 1( ) ( )T T S T S T   . 
Since 
*
1T T , so we can get
* *
2 1T T , then  
* *
* * * * * *1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2
0 0
( , , ) (1 ) (1 ) ( , , ),k k
T T
T S T S
C C
   
 
        
Which implies that
* * *
2 2 2( , , )T S   is dominated by
* * *
1 1 1( , , )T S  . 
We subsequently compare 
* * *
1 1 1( , , )T S   with 
* * *
3 3 3( , , )T S  . We define 3 2( ) ( ) ( )f S N S T S  . 
Recall that ( )N S is increasing with S and 2 ( )T S  is decreasing in S . It is obvious that 3( )f S  is 
increasing with S . As  
* 2 2 *2 2 2 * 1
1 1 1*
3 1 *
1
1 *
1
*
1
1
*
1 *
1
1 1
01 1 1 1
0
( 1) (1 ) ( 1) ( 1) 2 (1 )(1 )
( )  ( )
2
2 ( )
         < ( )
2
         ( )
( 1)
         ( ) ( ) ( )
1
      
k
k
k
k k
k k k k
k k S C k k k S C k CS k k k B
f S C C
k S
k C SB
C C
S k
B
C C S C
S
CB k B
C
k


   
          
   


 

   


 
  
1 1
01 1 1 1
0
1
   ( ) (( ) ( ) ) 0
1
k k
k k k k
B k
C
k


   

  
 
 
and 3
*
3( ) 0f S  , then 
* *
1 3S S . Thus, 
* * * * * *
1 1 1 3 3 3* *
1 3
( , , ) ( , , ),
B B
T S T S
S S
       which implies 
that 
* * *
3 3 3( , , )T S   is also dominated by 
* * *
1 1 1( , , )T S  .  
In summary, the optimal solution of Model (B) is 
* * *
1 1 1( , , )T S  , that is,  
1 1
** * 0 01 1 1 1
0 0( , , ) ( ( 1)( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) , ).
1 1
 
k k
k k k k
C CB B
T S C k
k k
 
      
   
 
In this case, 
1
** * 1 1
0
( 1)
( , , ) ( )
k
k k
k B
T S
C


 

  . 
2. When 0
1
C
B
k



, recall that 
*
2 0T  , we can easily obtain that               
*
* * * * * *2
2 2 2 1 1 1
0
( , , ) ( 1 ) ( , , ) .k
T
T S T S
C
   

       
Moreover, we can determine that 
*
3 3 3( ) 0 ( )
B
f f S 

, thus 
*
3
B
S 

 and then 
* * * * * *
3 3 3 1 1 1*
3
( , , ) ( , , )
B
T S T S
S
       .  
Therefore, the optimal solution of Model (B) is 
* * *
1 1 1( , , )T S  , i.e., 
*
* * *
1 1 1 0
( 1)
( , , ) (0,[ , ],[ ,min{ ,1}])
1
C B k B
T S
k C
 
 

  
. In this case, 
** *,( , ) .T S     In this paper, we 
choose the solution which make reimbursement rate large as the optimal solution, i.e., 
* * *
1 1 1
( 1)
( , , ) (0, ,min{ ,1})
B k B
T S
C



 
. In this case, 
** *, ,( ) .T S     
The proof of Theorem 3 is complete. 
 
Appendix B3: the proof of Proposition 1 
 
For part 1-3, According to Theorem 3, we prove each part of this proposition in two 
cases, namely 0 0,  .
1 1
C C
B B
k k
  
 
 
 
1. When 0 ,
1
C
B
k



 
                
*
01 1
*
*
01 1
* 1 1* *
1 1
0 0
1
( ) ( ) 0,
1
0,
1 1
( ) ( ) 0,
1 1
( , , ) ( 1)
( ) 0.
k k
k k
k k
k k
k k
CT B
B k
B
CS B
B k k
T S k k B
B C C





 

 

 

 

  
   




 
    
 
  

 
When 0
1
C
B
k



, 
** *, ,T S and
** *( , , )T S   are all constant with respect to B , that is 
* ** * * *( , , )
0, 0, 0, 0
T S T S
B B B B
    
   
   
. Therefore, 
** * * * *( , , )
0, 0, 0, 0.
T S T S
B B B B
    
   
   
 
2. When 0 ,
1
C
B
k



 
1*
1
0 0
*
0
1 1*
01 1
2
0
* 1 1* *
1 1
2
0 0 0
( 1)
( ) 0,
1 1
1 0,
( ) ( ) 0,
( 1) 1
( , , ) ( 1)
( ) 0.
k
k k
k k
T k k B k
C C C C
k C k
CS Ck B
k k
T S k k B
C C
 




 





 

 
 
    
   

 

 
   
 
   

 
When 0
1
C
B
k



, 
* ** * * *
0 0 0 0
( , , )
0, 1 0, 0, 0.
1
T S C T S
k

  


   
     
    
 
To conclude, 
* ** * * *
0 0 0 0
( , , )
0, 0, 0, 0.
T S T S
  
 

   
   
   
 
 3.  When 0 ,
1
C
B
k



it implies that 
*
0
k

 . To prove the monotonicity of *T with respect 
to k , we first define  
                   
1
01 1( ) ( 1)( ) ( ) .
1
k
k k
CB
H k k
k

  
 
 
We can obtain that 0
1
ln ( ) ln( 1) ln ln .
1 1 1
CB k
H k k
k k k

   
   
 
Differentiating the above equation with respect to k , we obtain
0
1
01 1
2
1 ln
( 1)
( ) ( 1)( ) ( ) 0.
1 ( 1)
k
k k
C
CB k B
H k k
k k


 



   
  
 
Note that 
*
0 ( )T C H k  , hence, 
*
( ) 0.
T
H k
k

  

 
Below we investigate the relationship between *S and k . 
We first define 
0( ) ln .
( 1)
C
G k k
k B

 

 
Obviously, ( ) 0G k  . 
When 0 , (1) 0
2
C
B G
e

  for any (0,1]k . Thus, 
*
*
2
( )
0.
( 1)
S G k
S
k k

 
 
 
When 0 0 ,  (0) 0
2 1
C C
B G
e k
  
  

and (1) 0G  . There exists a unique root for ( )G k in (0,1) .This 
unique root is denoted by 0k . Note that
*
*
2
( )
( 1)
S G k
S
k k


 
 and ( ) 0G k  , it implies that 
*
0
S
k



 for
0k k and
*
0
S
k



for 0k k , that is, 
*
0
S
k


£ . 
0 0
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2 2 3
* 20 0
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* 0 0 0
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( 1)
( 1)
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       0
( 1)
k B k B
k k k k
C C
S
k
k B
k
C
S
k
 

 
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 



 

 

 
In a similar manner, we can prove the relationship between * * *( , , )T S  and k . Hence the 
proof is omitted. 
We prove part 4. as follows. Observe that given the first constraint of Problem (B), if B is 
zero then S  is also zero. In conjunction with Proposition 1, this implies that 0T c    and 
hence 
T
C

 
 . Substituting into the equations for and of Theorem 1. Part 1. gives (a) 
(1 )k

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     The proof of Proposition 2 is complete. 
 
Appendix B4:  the proof of Theorem 4 
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For convenience, we denote
** * *( , , , )imim im imT S r  as the optimal solution of Model ( . )E i . We 
solve Models ( .1),  ( .2),  ( .3)E E E  and begin with Model ( .1)E . Obviously, when r is higher, the 
taxes collected from hospital is higher, which is more beneficial to villagers. So, the optimal tax 
rate is always equal to 0r .  And, from
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Next, using the same method to solve model ( .2)E . 
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Using the same method as showed in Model ( .1)E , we can get the optimal contract is
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The solving process of Model ( .3)E is similar to model ( .1)E , here, we omit the detailed 
procedure and present the optimal contract is 
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Comparing the optimal contract of model ( .1)E , model ( .2)E , model ( .3)E , it is obvious that 
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So, the optimal contract is as follows: 
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